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FAIRNESS OPINIONS AS MAGIC
PIECES OF PAPER
DALE A. OESTERLE*
The prior presenters, Professors Fiflis' and Carney,2 and I agree that
in the last ten years there have been startling cases of misbehavior by
investment bankers who provide "fairness opinions" in corporate acqui-
sitions. Yet nary a banker has paid a penny in damages for a contrived
fairness opinion.' Professor Fiflis would remedy this situation by holding
investment bankers liable directly to shareholders under a fiduciary duty
standard. Professor Carney finds nothing to remedy except, perhaps, the
excessive meddling of state courts and the Securities and Exchange Com-
mission (SEC).
I offer a third approach, more modest than Professor Fiflis' and more
ambitious than Professor Carney's. I would encourage state courts to
move in two corroborating directions. The first suggestion is a change in
doctrine; the second is a change in the application of existing doctrine.
First, the legal relationship of an investment banker providing a fair-
ness opinion and a clientfirm ought to be defined by fiduciary principles
rather than straight contract principles. Unlike Professor Fiflis, I would
limit, absent special circumstances, an aggrieved shareholder's remedy to
a shareholder derivative action. Second, state courts, evaluating the con-
duct of directors, should view the directors' reliance on a questionable
fairness opinion as evidence of an absence of due care. Courts at present
seem to use a one-way gate: good-faith reliance on a fairness opinion is
evidence of due care while reliance on an inappropriate opinion is oddly
neutral in the due-care analysis, eliminating only the potential benefit of
an expert's assistance as justificatory. Reliance on a contrived fairness
opinion ought to be evidence of, first, a board's efforts to hoodwink its
* Professor of Law, Cornell Law School
1. Ted J. Fiflis, Responsibility of Investment Bankers to Shareholders, 70 WASH. U. L.Q. 497
(1992).
2. William J. Carney, Fairness Opinions" How Fair Are They and Why Should We Do Nothing
About It, 70 WASH. U. L.Q. 523 (1992).
3. This Article does not cover the liability of an investment banker to an opposing party in a
negotiated acquisition. See CPC Int'l, Inc. v. McKesson Corp., 514 N.E.2d 116 (N.Y. 1987) (com-
plaint stated a valid cause of action in fraud).
Washington University Open Scholarship
542 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY
shareholders and, second, a board's failure to use legitimate, reputable
experts to inform itself diligently and conscientiously on crucial matters.
I explain each suggestion in Section IV below, after I discuss the mer-
its of the approaches of Professors Carney and Fiflis in Sections II and
III. Section I contains a background discussion on the nature of fairness
opinions.
I. FAIRNESS OPINIONS AS WINDOW DRESSING
The worst abuses associated with fairness opinions have occurred in
leveraged buyouts (LBOs) of publicly traded firms. In most LBOs, an
LBO promoter-typically either a specialized partnership4 or the
merchant banking division of an investment bank--joins forces with se-
nior management of a publicly held firm and raises enough capital to buy
all the stock, taking the firm private. The LBO group can be the victori-
ous bidder in an auction, either stimulated by the LBO announcement or
by a hostile takeover bid, or it can be the only bidder.
Participants in LBOs turn to investment banking firms for assistance
in structuring bids and mounting defenses. The investment bankers ad-
vise on strategy, evaluate offers, secure private financing, and underwrite
public distributions of debt securities. Formal, written price evaluations,
"fairness opinions," appear in two contexts. First, in defense of hostile
tender offers, target managers invariably obtains a statement from a fi-
nancial advisor that the offered price is "grossly inadequate." Second, in
support of an LBO, a board of directors' subcommittee, consisting of the
outside directors, invariably obtains a statement from a financial advisor
that the offer of the buyout group is "within the range of fair prices." In
both situations, depending on context, federal securities law may require
the communication of the opinion's contents to firm shareholders.
As Professor Carney points out, directors use formal, written fairness
opinions primarily to protect themselves from personal liability in the
inevitable shareholder lawsuits that follow all major acquisitions. The
defendant board points to its good faith reliance on an expert opinion in
support of its decision to sell or not to sell the firm. If a board communi-
cates the contents of an opinion to shareholders, the board also intends to
4. For example, Adler Shaykin, Clayton Dublilier, Forstmann Little, Gibbons Green, Hick &
Hass, Kelso, Kohlberg Kravis Roberts, Riordan Freeman, Thomas Lee, Warburg Pincus, and
Wesray.
5. For example, Allen & Company, Bankers Trust, Citicorp, Donalson Lufkin & Jenrette,
First Boston, Merrill Lynch, and Morgan Stanley.
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https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol70/iss2/14
FAIRNESS OPINIONS AS MAGIC PIECES OF PAPER
use the opinion to influence shareholder action-to deter shareholders
from tendering stock into a hostile offer or to encourage shareholders
either to vote for or tender into a buyout group's offer. The second pur-
pose is less important than the first, however, as the board recognizes
that its own recommendation, artfully communicated to shareholders
even if without the gloss of an expert's support, is usually enough to
influence shareholder action in desired directions.
Suspicious fairness opinions have helped LBO groups buy firms very
cheaply by understating the value of the firm and have helped target
managers repel very generous hostile bids by overstating the value of the
firm. Professor Carney's citation of numerous examples of problematic
opinions does not exhaust the field. I would be more sympathetic to the
argument that fairness opinions involve complex projections that have an
inherently high degree of error if I could find more inaccurate fairness
opinions that were against the interests of the hiring board-fairness
opinions that overstated the value of the firm in a management-led
buyout or that understated the value of the firm in defense of a hostile
bid. The few examples that do exist are dwarfed by the cases that involve
errors in favor of the interested board.
My favorite example is the 1983 transaction that had every CEO in the
country calling a buyout promoter-the Metromedia LBO.6 John
Kluge's "legal" theft of his own company, making him overnight the
wealthiest individual in America, is to LBOs in the 1980s what the Beach
Boys where to surfer songs in the 1960s. In December 1983, four senior
officers, led by CEO John Kluge, proposed an early form of a leveraged
buyout-the company was to be taken private by merging it into a com-
pany privately owned (ninety-six percent) by the officers. Each share of
Metromedia was to be converted into cash and subordinated debentures
worth around forty dollars a share for a total purchase price of $1.1 bil-
lion. The stockholders, in a class action, sued, attacking the price as
inadequate.
The Metromedia directors appointed four of their own, who were not
part of the buyout group, to represent the interests of the shareholders.
The special committee hired two investment banks, Shearson Lehman
and Bear Stearns, to give fairness opinions. Both opined that the firm
was worth $1.114 billion, adding $.69 a share to the original offer. Me-
6. See Benjamin J. Stein, Where are the Shareholders' Yachts: But John Kluge Pockets Billions
from Metromedia's LBO, BARRON'S, Aug. 16, 1986, at 6-7. There is some minor dispute over the
exact numbers. The text uses the numbers from the court litigation. See infra note 7.
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tromedia used the opinions to settle the class action, obtaining judicial
approval from the Delaware Chancery Court. The opinions were also
included in proxy material sent to shareholders, leading the shareholders
to vote overwhelmingly in favor of the merger.
Less than a year later, Metromedia sold its television stations for two
billion dollars, and within two years it liquidated its remaining assets for
$2.5 billion, for a total of $4.5 billion. Had the public shareholders par-
ticipated in the liquidation, they would have received around eighty-four
more dollars a share than the cash-out price. Angry shareholders, who
had released their claims against Metromedia and its officials in settling
the class action, looked for new defendants. The obvious target was the
investment bankers who had undervalued the firm in their fairness
opinions.
In subsequent litigation against the investment bankers, the plaintiffs
alleged that Shearson Lehman had been paid four million dollars for its
fairness opinion, seven hundred and fifty thousand up front and just over
three million contingent on the merger's succeeding. The plaintiffs also
alleged that Bear Stearns was paid over two million dollars for its opin-
ion, five hundred thousand up front and two million contingent on the
success of the buyout. The New York Court of Appeals dismissed the
case, over a vigorous dissent, on the grounds that the class action settle-
ment agreement, releasing "anyone else in connection with... the ac-
tion," covered the investment bankers, even though the bankers were not
parties to the original action.7 The plaintiffs' lawyers who settled the
shareholder class action on the cheap, by the way, pocketed one million
dollars for their efforts.
John Kluge became a very wealthy man and, to the business commu-
nity, he did it "legally." The LBO stampede was on.
II. FAIRNESS OPINIONS AS "MAGIC PIECES OF PAPER"
Professor Carney makes three basic points. First, fairness opinions are
useful to shore up breaches in the business judgment rule, weakened
without justification by state courts. He argues that these stylized, brief
pieces of paper seem to appease and calm meddling state courts who,
without the paper, would over-regulate board decisions in major acquisi-
tions. The cost of a fairness opinion is, therefore, best understood as a
7. Wells v. Shearson Lehman/American Express, Inc., 526 N.E.2d 8, 10 (N.Y. 1988).
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judicial tax on deals, transferring wealth to investment bankers and ne-
cessitated by the officiousness of state court judges.
Unfortunately, this view of fairness opinions is widely held in the in-
vestment banking community. Consider the remarks of Saul Cohen, at
the time general counsel of Drexel Burnham:
[L]ook at the reality of deals and what investment bankers do and do not
do. It is important not to get hung up on a piece of paper seven paragraphs
long, which disclaims knowledge of everything, and at its end notes, from a
financial point of view, that this price is within a range of fairness, or words
to that effect. That opinion should be seen as a "magic" piece of paper
which people need to close deals. Within the process as a whole, it really
should not be taken as much more than a "magic" piece of paper ...
[What do the shareholders (and I do not believe there are any shareholders
at the end of these situations, so for shareholders read "arbitragers") rely
on, save for the bank's reputation for getting deals done?8
In other words, a fairness opinion is demanded by directors worried
about personal liability; they will not close a deal without one.
This pragmatic, almost cynical view of fairness opinions is a cute
dodge for not dealing with the problems of fairness opinions' content.
Investment bankers and their clients play the fairness opinion game to
close deals, nothing more. The opinions are designed to satisfy the
whims of judges, who are looking for clear, clean sign posts in their eval-
uation of director conduct in acquisitions.
The problem with this view is that it is self-defeating. Courts will
catch on (and I note the smiling visage in the audience of Justice Moore
of the Delaware Supreme Court). When they do, a seven paragraph fair-
ness opinion may be evidence not of director care but of director negli-
gence. A short fairness opinion may come to be itself a red flag for
8. Inyestment Banker Liability: Transcription of a Panel Discussion, 16 DEL. J. CORP. L. 557,
574 (1991) (remarks of Saul Cohen). Other remarks by Mr. Cohen include the following:
Bershad (a plaintiff's lawyer): Fairness opinions and how they are developed really count
Cohen: Opinions create the nexus for the (read "your") lawsuit... How seriously are such
opinions entitled to be taken? They are a page and a half, perhaps seven paragraphs in all.
The first couple of paragraphs say what the argument is. The next paragraph says what the
banker has looked at. The next paragraph says what the banker has not looked at. The
next paragraph says we have no appraisals from third parties and did not make any our-
selves. And at the end, with a reference to "from a financial point of view," the opinion
says it is within a range of fairness.
Bershad: The courts are striking down these boilerplate opinions. They will not accept
such drivel.
Cohen: Fairness opinions reflect the process that precedes them.
1992]
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director misconduct. Far from protecting directors, conclusory fairness
opinions will increase director exposure to liability.
The same transition from salve to salt is occurring with solvency opin-
ions: written, formal, conclusory opinions given by investment bankers in
LBOs that a firm, immediately after the LBO is "solvent." Solvency dec-
larations were intended to inhibit fraudulent-conveyance-act liability for
selling shareholders, acquisition lenders, and professional advisors if a
firm took bankruptcy within five years of the buyout.9 Bankruptcy
judges have come to view the letters as unacceptable excuses for a
board's lack of a thorough internal review of the solvency of a post-LBO
firm. 10
Professor Carney's second argument is more serious. Assuming fair-
ness opinions are useful, that is, that their content has meaning, he ar-
gues that the opinions necessarily must be general and inherently
imprecise. Valuations of a target firm float free of the stock market's
estimates of aggregate value because the bids are invariably and expec-
tantly at a substantial premium over pre-announcement stock market
prices. Accordingly, valuations become extremely speculative as the
bankers balance many factors, value illiquid and fluctuating assets, fol-
low different valuation standards, and use different goals. In sum, the
margin for error in the predictions of any fairness opinion, even the most
conscientiously and capably rendered, is huge.
As a consequence, Professor Carney argues, courts are incapable of
judging whether an investment banker misbehaved in providing any one
specific opinion. Courts will not be able to distinguish between good
opinions that proved to be wrong and bad opinions that were inappropri-
ate when written. At the hands of ignorant, unctuous judges, innocent
defendants will suffer and shareholders will enjoy windfall gains.
Fairness opinions will become deal insurance or one-way earnouts for
selling shareholders; if post-LBO events show a purchase price to be low,
selling shareholders can claim additional proceeds by suing on the opin-
ion. If the selling price is high, on the other hand-the LBO goes into
immediate bankruptcy, for example-the buyout group cannot recover
some of the sale proceeds from the shareholders. Of course, this will
affect dramatically and adversely the incentives of LBO buyout groups.
9. See DALE A. OESTERLE, THE LAW OF MERGERS, ACQUISITIONS, AND REORGANIZA-
TIONS 201-17 (1991).
10. See Joseph H. Levie, Do Solvency Letters Help? Or Are They Dangerous?, N.Y. L.J., Sept. 5,
1991, at 5.
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Fewer will bid, and those that do will pay less because they can no longer
recover the full value of their post-LBO efforts to improve the firm.
Professor Carney has a valid point, but he proves too much. In mak-
ing an argument that courts should not hear shareholder suits against
investment bankers on fairness opinions because the opinions are so nec-
essarily imprecise, he overlooks the many other situations in which
courts must evaluate the content of fairness opinions. Two of these situa-
tions are close to his heart. First, he asks that courts apply business judg-
ment rule principles to protect directors who rely on fairness opinions.
But the directors' reliance, under most corporate codes, must be reason-
able and in good faith. He admits that the courts have a role to play and
that they ought to (and do) step in occasionally to block some acquisi-
tions. I I In such cases, an evaluation of the reasonableness and good faith
of the directors' reliance on a fairness opinion will include an evaluation
of, at minimum, the ostensible sensibility of the content of the opinion
relied on.
Second, to control investment bankers' misfeasance, Professor Carney
necessarily relies on the ability of the firm (rather than firm shareholders)
to sue investment bankers under contract theories for inappropriate opin-
ions. By rendering a bad opinion, the bankers have breached their con-
tract with the client firm. Yet in any such case, the court will have to
evaluate the content of the opinion to see if the contract was breached or
performed.
A better solution would seem to admit that we have to help our courts,
not fight them. We need to improve the quality of fairness opinions. Op-
timally, the investment banking community would itself take the lead. It
could develop professional standards that educate our judges on what
they ought to expect from a sound, professional opinion. t2 Bankers
could define and articulate various standards for fairness opinions and
suggest when the use of one standard may be more appropriate than an-
other. Moreover, bankers could suggest minimum criteria for investigat-
ing particular kinds of valuations. Finally, bankers should consider
developing basic conflict-of-interest rules for those providing fairness
opinions. In the absence of a professional declaration, courts or the SEC
necessarily will have to assume this role.
Instead of the infamous seven paragraphs, fairness opinions ought to
11. See Carney, supra note 2, at 540.
12. See infra note 42 and accompanying text.
1992]
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begin with a statement of the kind of standard used and then reveal the
bases of the estimates. Ideally, the explanation of the calculations will
become more valuable than the ultimate recommendation, as others can
use the full document to reach their own, perhaps different, conclusions.
The opinion itself ought to disclose the compensation arrangement for
the opinion and whether the preparer is otherwise interested in the con-
summation of the transaction.
At issue, however, is how courts can encourage bankers to develop and
use more professional standards for fairness opinions.1 3
Professor Carney's third point has a familiar melody-the stock mar-
ket works well without reference to fairness opinions; fairness opinions
are simply inconsequential and ought not be the subject of inherently
spurious litigation. His evidence is twofold. First, selling shareholders in
LBOs and cash-out mergers usually receive well in excess of the pre-
transaction market price for their shares. Accordingly, they cannot have
been injured by contrived fairness opinions. Indeed, if the fairness opin-
ions are a necessary artifice to close deals (to appease directors worried
about meddling courts), contrived fairness opinions have benefitted, not
injured, selling shareholders who have profited handsomely from the
transactions. Second, he argues that shareholders could, if they wished,
protect themselves by favoring firms that sport provisions in corporate
charters prohibiting LBOs or cash-out mergers. He infers from the ab-
sence of such provisions that shareholders generally favor the prospect of
LBOs or cash-out mergers.
In his third argument, Professor Carney trivializes the dominant prob-
lem in LBOs-agency costs. The LBO buyout group has the benefit of
the knowledge and expertise of firm insiders and is acting cohesively.
Their opposites in the deal are a diffuse group of public shareholders who
typically do not have intimate access to firm information and who can-
not, without great difficulty, act in unison. The buyout group has an
informational and a structural bargaining advantage. Complicating the
picture is the shareholders' patterned reliance on law-their managers
owe them the duties of due care and loyalty.
The opportunities for abuse are obvious-managers can use LBOs to
trade on many forms of insider information. But even the most favored
rationale for LBOs has a dark side. Finance experts have come to justify
13. On this matter Professor Fiflis and I agree that some change in doctrine may be necessary;
we disagree on the details of the change.
[Vol. 70:541
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LBOs as a positive realignment of management incentives.14 LBOs give
managers a more substantial equity stake in the corporation and thus
induce them to achieve more faithfully the goal of maximizing the worth
of the business. The position is not very satisfying, however, because it
necessarily means that managers are acting suboptimally for their public
shareholders.
Why do the managers not do all the value-enhancing asset manipula-
tion we see after an LBO when they earn over a million dollars or so a
year as fiduciaries for public shareholders? More specifically, why do we
not tie managers' compensation in publicly traded companies exclusively
to stock performance to achieve the same incentive effect as is present in
an LBO? Is it because managers in publicly traded companies control in
large part their own methods of compensation? A troubling conclusion
to all this could be that managers protect themselves from the negative
effects of shirking in publicly traded companies (earning substantial sala-
ries) and then, when the adverse effects on the firm accumulate, take the
firm private and profit personally from undoing the harm they have
caused.
In this context, Professor Carney's bid-price data seem incomplete. 15
Buyout groups must, of course, bid over pretransaction prices for any
LBO to succeed, and the bid itself reveals significant new information to
the stock market. Insiders believe that they can make a profit by
manipulating or massaging firm assets in ways not pursued by existing
14. See, eg., Steven Kaplan, The Effects of Management Buyouts on Operating Performance
and Value, 24 J. FIN. EcON. 217 (1989).
15. There are better data for Professor Carney's argument from the fine work of Steven Kaplan,
who gathers data on the LBOs of the 1980s. In a 1989 paper studying LBOs from 1980 to 1986,
Kaplan found that mean market-adjusted returns to prebuyout investors were 46.7% as compared
with mean market-adjusted returns to post-buyout investors (including equity and debt) of 41.9%.
Kaplan, supra note 14, at 237-38. His data is susceptible to other interpretations. He does not break
out the market-adjusted returns of post-buyout equity holders from debt holders. The nominal or
real returns to post-buyout equity holders has a mean of 4,274.6%! Calculating a market-adjusted
return would discount this figure for the extreme risk absorbed by post-LBO equity holders. But one
must be careful here. The risk absorbed is tempered by the effects of inside information. In layper-
son's terms, if you know you can do it, it isn't risky.
At issue, however, is why a buyout is necessary to record such gains and why officials managing
publicly held firms do not, by manipulating assets in ways that match the post-LBO behavior of
managers, provide a larger share of the gains to public shareholders.
Kaplan also found that 32 buyout companies provided usable projections in their proxy statement,
projections that presumably were also behind fairness opinions. Those companies consistently un-
derachieved their projections. If managers are duping shareholders, one would expect the opposite
to be true. I have trouble reconciling this data with the huge gains made by post-buyout equity
holders.
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management. At issue is the ability of the shareholders to bargain effec-
tively to claim a sizeable part of the value of this new information. The
LBO group has an incentive to understate the new value.1 6 The occa-
sional appearance of an outside bidder provides some (although not per-
fect) guarantee of disclosure, through price, of the buyout group's
valuation of the firm,17 but many LBOs are uncontested. Thus the argu-
ment that LBO prices always exceed pretransaction prices for firm stock
proves little.
Moreover, there are real social costs to disabling selling shareholders
across the board from bargaining effectively in LBOs. A limit on the
potential upside returns in LBOs will cause all shareholders to discount
all stock systematically. Stock prices will be uniformly lower and all
firms' costs of capital uniformly higher. In this sense, Professor Carney's
argument has a self-serving quality to it, as the pretransaction prices will
16. But see supra note 15.
17. Kaplan finds that market-adjusted returns earned by prebuyout shareholders in buyouts
with and without active third-party participation are 33.1% and 37.1% respectively. See Kaplan,
supra note 14, at 247. The four percent difference is statistically insignificant. See also Jeffry Davis
& Kenneth Lehn, Information Asymmetries, Rule 13e-3 and Premiums in Going-Private Transac-
tions, 70 WASH. U. L.Q. 587 (1992) (premiums in third-party takeovers are equivalent to premiums
paid in LBOs). Why do LBO premiums match average premiums third-party bidders pay? In a real
sense, actual or potential premiums third-party bidders offer will affect the strategy of LBO offers. If
any one factor protects shareholders in LBO, it is this. Of course, as the likelihood of competing
bidders diminishes, the protection evaporates. In assessing the damage contrived fairness opinions
caused in any individual case, the presence or threat of a third-party bidder will be an important
factor in a judge or jury's finding of causation.
But there is a flip side to the analysis: the LBO bid will also affect any third-party bid, An
insider's bid for its own firm imparts material information about the firm to all market participants,
including third-party bidders. In a real sense, the premium offered by a credible offer from an LBO
firm puts a ceiling range on the price many third-party firms, with inferior information, ought to
offer to buy the firm (unless there are unique synergies available to the third party that the insiders
cannot claim). How, for example, can an outsider justify to its own investors relying on projections
of firm value that insiders think are wildly optimistic? In other words, LBO bids may affect outside
bids as much as outside bids affect LBO bids. If an LBO bid is undervalued and yet credible (be-
cause of the manipulation of disclosed information through, inter alia, fairness opinions), third-party
bids also may be undervalued.
Finally, in comparing LBOs and third-party takeovers one may be comparing apples and oranges,
In third-party takeovers bought by operating firms, motivation is largely strategic. The firm hopes
that the combined operation of two firms will generate real efficiencies in operation or finance. In
LBOs, existing managers manipulate existing assets to generate new value; synergy gains typically
are not available. Thus LBOs generate gains, through pure firm asset manipulation, that are equal to
projected gains from strategic mergers (which include asset manipulation and synergy gains). Third-
party bidders with full information ought to pay significantly more than LBOs groups. They do not,
indicating, perhaps, a fundamental information disparity that advantages LBO groups in the
bidding.
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be lower in some amount because of the absence of shareholder bargain-
ing power in LBO negotiations.
Professor Carney's answer to this concern is his second bit of data. If
there is systematic stock price depression, firms individually could lower
their cost of capital and be more successful competitors in the products
markets by choosing to insert firm-specific prohibitions against LBOs in
their corporate charters. Since firms do not do this, the agency costs of
LBOs must be overstated. Yet, the same problems of corporate structure
that create the agency costs, which allow public managers to shirk and
which protect their compensation from the effects of shirking, also will
enable managers to block any provision that may inhibit their power to
partL'ipate in an LBO. Managers will not favor anti-LBO provisions and
they will block them in their own interest, even if not in the interest of
their firms. Without changing the current corporate legal structure, one
cannot expect managers to encourage their firms to adopt such
provisions.
There are additional rebuttals as well. Any firm that wishes to insert
such a provision in its charter faces severe drafting problems. How can
firms distinguish and prohibit, in specific language, only inappropriate
LBOs? A provision eliminating all LBOs drastically will reduce the fi-
nancing flexibility of the firm; any firm making the effort would un-
doubtedly find that it has unintended and harmful consequences. 18 And
the provision would be permanent; to be effective, it would have to carry
very high super-majority vote protection, applying in votes on statutory
mergers and asset sales as well as charter modifications. If such a provi-
sion acts to limit the potential upside returns from appropriate LBOs, it
would depress the value of the stock.
The best rule would seem to be the one courts are now working to put
in place. In other words, drafters of corporate charter provisions, if put
to the task, would be drafting a language that mimics evolving law.
LBOs must be fair to shareholders, and fairness is measured by price
alone if there are no procedural protections. Fairness opinions, properly
used, aid directors in their assessment of a fair price.
Even if shareholders could get charter prohibitions against LBOs capa-
bly drafted and passed, perhaps we do not see such provisions because
they do not get at the core of the agency problem-agency costs in pub-
18. How would a drafter exempt an honest merger of a publicly held firm into a privately held
firm in which the managers of the publicly held firm retained their positions?
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licly traded companies. Eliminating the prospect of management partici-
pation in LBOs will not improve the incentives and performance of
managers in publicly held companies. 9 LBOs allow shareholders, in
some cases, a partial recovery of lost agency costs. Some relief is better
than none. As such, LBOs are a pitifully poor stop-gap remedy to a
problem that is more endemic and needs deeper and more lasting solu-
tions, solutions that focus on executive compensation in publicly traded
companies. 20
III. FAIRNESS OPINIONS AS THE "NEXUS FOR LAWSUITS" '21
Professor Fiflis, on the other hand, searches precedent to support a
new source of liability.2 2 He argues that investment bankers who write
fairness opinions ought to assume the legal status of fiduciaries to share-
holders and, as such, ought to be directly liable to shareholders for lack
of due care. In sum, our courts ought to use investment bankers as gate-
keepers, responsible to shareholders for stopping improvident deals.
This would be a major change in doctrine. At present, investment
bankers are not liable directly to shareholders under state law unless they
aid and abet directors who themselves breach their fiduciary duty to the
firm.23 Investment bankers also may be directly liable to shareholders
under various provisions of the federal securities acts and rules if, for
example, they fail to exercise due diligence as "experts" under Section 11
19. Unless, of course, one believes that the prospect of LBOs creates a moral hazard-execu-
tives deliberately erect removable problems in their firms to depress firm prices in anticipation of an
LBO, after which they will correct the problems and enjoy the benefits of the increased firm value.
This is dangerous. It may attract unwanted competitive bidders who have discerned the ploy.
20. For a description of the lack of correlation between executive pay and performance, see
GRAEF S. CRYSTAL, IN SEARCH OF EXCESS: OVERCOMPENSATION OF AMERICAN EXECUTIVES
(1992).
21. See supra note 8.
22. He is not the first. See Carol B. Haight, Note, The Standard of Care Required of an Invest-
ment Banker to Minority Shareholders in a Cash-Out Merger: Weinberger v UOP, Inc., 8 DEL. J.
CORP. L. 98 (1983); Robert J. Giuffra, Jr., Note, Investment Bankers'Fairness Opinions in Corporate
Control Transaction, 96 YALE L.J. 119 (1986).
23. Mills Acquisition Co. v. Macmillan, Inc., 559 A.2d 1261, 1283-84 n.33 (Del. 1988)(invest-
ment banker tipped off the management bidder on the content of an opposing bidder's sealed bid).
Aiding and abetting liability requires that the plaintiff establish that a fiduciary relationship existed
between the plaintiff and the directors, that the directors breached that fiduciary duty, and that the
investment banker knowingly participated in the director's breach. See Ronald A. Brown, Jr., Note,
Claims of Aiding and Abetting A Director's Breach of Fiduciary Duty-Does Everybody Who Deals
with a Delaware Director Owe Fiduciary Duties to that Director's Shareholders?, 15 DEL. J. CORP. L.
943 (1990).
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of the Securities Act of 1933,24 engage in willful violations of various
antifraud provisions in the Exchange Act of 1934 (SEC Rule lOb-5, sec-
tion 14(e), or Rule 13e-3),25 or engage in negligent violations of SEC
Rule 14a-9.26 Each of these forms of liability is fairly narrow.
Professor Fiffis acknowledges that Delaware case law does not pres-
ently support his theory.2 7 He also acknowledges that the two New York
cases on which he relies, both from intermediate appeals courts, do not
directly support his theory. In my view, the cases also do not comport
with New York law as defined by its top court, the Court of Appeals.2
They may not be good law. In any event, the Court of Appeals would be
24. The 1933 Act may apply if the LBO group is exchanging securities, usually debt or pre-
ferred stock, for outstanding common stock in a publicly held firm. The 1933 Act requires that the
group file with the SEC and give to all purchasers a disclosure document (a prospectus). If the
disclosure document is false or misleading, all those who participate in its creation are potentially
liable under § 11 of the Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77k (1988). Experts can, however,
establish a "due diligence" defense. A false fairness opinion, included in the disclosure document,
could make its authors liable under § 11.
25. See generally Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185 (1976) (scienter required for Rule
1Ob-5 violations). See also Giuffa, supra note 22.
26. Herskowitz v. Nutri/System, Inc., 857 F.2d 179, 190 (3d. Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 489 U.S.
1054, 1060 (1989). Section 14(a) of the Exchange Act of 1934 only applies, of course, if an LBO
target seeks a vote of its public shareholders approving the transaction. In Herskowitz, a fairness
opinion was included in the offending proxy statement. See 15 U.S.C. § 78n(a) (1988).
27. See Haight, supra note 22. See also In re Shoe-Town, No. 9843, 1990 Del. Ch. LEXIS 14
(Del. Ch. Feb. 12, 1990).
28. The near privity test laid out by the court of appeals in Credit Alliance Corp. v. Arthur
Andersen & Co., 483 N.E.2d 110 (N.Y. 1985), Ultramares Corp. v. Touche, 174 N.E. 441 (N.Y.
1931), and Glanzer v. Shepard, 135 N.E. 275 (N.Y. 1922), seems to require very specific knowledge
on the part of accountants of the identity of an affected third party. Under Credit Alliance, an audit
intended to influence a pre-identified potential bank lender would subject the auditor to liability, but
an audit intended to influence an unspecified group of potential lenders would not. An ever-chang-
ing, amorphous group of shareholders has not yet and would not seem to qualify under the near
privity test. If so, the even more restrictive opinion in Wells v. Shearson Lehman/American Ex-
press, Inc., 514 N.Y.S.2d 1 (App. Div. 1987), rev'd on other grounds, 526 N.E.2d 1 (N.Y. 1988),
would seem to be inconsistent with the court of appeals' view. In any event, in Schneider v. Lazard
Freres & Co., 552 N.Y.S.2d 571 (App. Div. 1990), the court's attempt to use a bizarre notion of
agency, attaching only to special subcommittees of the board empowered to sell the firm, and thus to
avoid the acknowledged limits of Credit Alliance, is a fanciful reconstruction of fiduciary doctrine.
For an example of one of the few cases that meets the very narrow confines of a "near privity" rule,
see Ossining Union Free School District v. Anderson, 539 N.E.2d 91 (N.Y. 1989).
For an argument in favor of Wells and against Schneider, see John C. Coffee, New York's New
Doctrine of "Constructive Privity," N.Y. L.J., Jan. 25, 1990, at 5. Professor Coffee also suggests that
the SEC, in combination with Wells, could act to moot Schneider. If the SEC required full disclo-
sure of fairness opinions in all tender offers and in all proxy statements dealing with control changes,
then Wells would control all significant cases of investment banker liability. Both Professors Carney
and Fiflis note that the SEC is already doing just that. Carney, supra note 2, at 529; Fiflis, supra
note I, at 498.
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well advised to reject any extension of either Wells or Schneider on pol-
icy grounds.
Professor Fiffis's argument pushes foreseeability of harm, an important
component of tort liability, beyond historical limits. Since investment
bankers can foresee the effects of fairness opinions on firm shareholders,
bankers should be responsible to those shareholders for any injury caused
by a negligently prepared opinion. Yet tort law has never succumbed to
the allure of relying exclusively on foreseeability in defining liability.2 9
Instead, throughout tort law are examples of caps on liability even when
harm is plainly foreseeable.30
The reasons for tort law's refusal to depend exclusively on foreseeabil-
ity of harm as defining liability-fear of excessive liability, exaggerated
damages, and relaxed self-protection-apply with force to investment
banker liability. Any fairness opinion rendered in a large LBO (recall
that the RJR Nabisco LBO was for over twenty-five billion dollars) ex-
poses an investment banker to staggering potential liability, hundreds or
even thousands of times any fee charged for the service. The problem is
compounded by the transferability of the firm's shares during periods
affected by any fairness opinion. Buyers and sellers between the an-
nouncement date of the deal (or public disclosure of the fairness opinion)
and the relevant shareholder act (either a vote or a tender of their stock)
and, perhaps even to the closing, all will be potential claimants.
Moreover, the harm shareholders suffer is a small part of the total
losses that may be tied to an unsuccessful LBO. Debt-holders, employ-
ees, and other affected parties injured, and foreseeably so, by an improvi-
dent deal will argue for treatment similar to that given shareholders.
Any theory of liability favoring shareholders will have to cap damages at
some multiple of fees, perhaps, and explain to discouraged debtholders
why they, and not shareholders, go away with empty pockets.
Investment banker liability to shareholders also will encourage share-
holders to exaggerate their losses to get damages when any LBO fails.
There are numerous types of these spurious claims. Sophisticated share-
29. For the general argument, see John A. Silicanio, Negligent Accounting and the Limits of
Instrumental Tort Reform, 86 MICH. L. REv. 1929 (1988). But see RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TORTS § 552(2) (1976) (providing an actual foreseeability standard in negligent misrepresentation
cases).
30. See Silicanio, supra note 29, at 1942-51 (discussing tort law's reluctance to allow third-
party recovery for pure economic loss). See also Robins Dry Dock & Repair Co. v. Flint, 275 U.S.
303 (1927).
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holders who supported the transaction, based on their own sources of
information and without significant reliance on any fairness opinion (per-
haps they view the opinion as Profess Carney does-as "a magic piece of
paper" necessary to close deals), will claim foul. Consider as well the
position of arbitrageurs (arbs), those who buy after the announcement
but before the exchange or tender of firm shares. An inappropriately low
evaluation of value in a fairness opinion will injure those who sell to arbs,
but arbs will have priced the low evaluation in what they will pay for the
stock. Are the arbs injured when they tender or exchange their stock to
close the deal if the final deal price, influenced by the opinion, is unfairly
low? Arbs will, of course, claim injury based on their loss of upside po-
tential gains, and courts will be hard pressed to ignore their pleas.
Finally, consider the effect of such a rule on the conduct of the major
actors. Optimally, exposing investment bankers to shareholder actions
will change bankers' behavior to reduce the number of negligently pre-
pared fairness opinions. The deterrence rationale is simple and classic;
yet, it is inherently overly optimistic. The reaction of investment bankers
may not be to provide better fairness opinions as much as it will be to
devise other strategies for limiting their liability exposure. The most ob-
vious strategy is for investment bankers to refuse to give fairness opinions
in high-risk cases. This is perhaps the most telling rebuttal to Professor
Fiflis' gatekeeper scheme: there is no rule that forces investment bankers
to stand guard at the gate.
Other avoidance strategies include indemnification provisions in client
contracts31 or contractual provisions that limit damages.32 At a mini-
mum, we ought to expect a magnification of current practice in which the
bankers expressly disclaim any attempt at independent investigation and
proclaim absolute reliance on figures submitted by firm employees in
hopes that any errors in the opinion can be blamed on firm employees.
Finally, as suggested by one court and favored by Professor Fiflis, bank-
ers concerned with open-ended liability could "expressly limit in their
certificates [read: fairness opinions] the persons or class of persons who
31. Professor Fiflis would prohibit indemnification provisions, but it is doubtful that investment
bankers, as fiduciaries, would be entitled to less indemnification protection than that currently avail-
able to officers and directors. See REV. MODEL BUSINESS CORP. ACT, Subch. E, §§ 8.50-8.58
(1991). Professor Coffee suggests indemnification as a way out. See Coffee, supra note 28.
32. See Coffee, supra note 28. Coffee also suggests that a firm could agree to arbitration and
forum selection clauses. Could the parties stipulate that Delaware, instead of New York, law applies
to such suits?
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would be entitled to rely upon the audit [read: evaluation]." 33
Even if there are marginal gains in the total quality of fairness opinions
under a shareholder liability rule, such gains may be offset by the social
losses generated by a reduction in the shareholders' incentive to look af-
ter their own affairs. The prospect of recovery from investment bankers
for an improvident LBO could encourage shareholders to relax the vigi-
lance they otherwise would have to maintain to look after their own in-
terests. 4 In addition, a special committee of the board of directors,
charged with representing the interests of the shareholders in an LBO
and able to secure a comforting fairness opinion, also may relax its efforts
to make sure the deal is priced fairly. For shareholders and for special
committees, shareholder liability tends to transform a fairness opinion
into a partial warranty of the LBO's fairness, and depresses such parties'
incentives to take independent care. This, of course, would not be lost on
investment bankers operating under a Fiflis rule; bankers would intensify
their strategic efforts to avoid exposure to liability.
IV. FAIRNESS OPINIONS AS EVIDENCE OF DIRECTOR [MIS]CONDUCT
My approach to the question of liability for negligently prepared in-
vestment banker fairness opinions, initially outlined briefly four years ago
in an article in the Vanderbilt Law Review,3" is similar to that Bebchuk
and Kahan take in their article in the Duke Law Journal.36 The basic
legal rules of current case law are essentially sound and need only a bit of
tinkering to tune them up.
Apart from specialized violations of the federal securities acts and
rules, investment bankers are not liable directly to shareholders for
poorly prepared fairness opinions unless they aid and abet a breach of
33. H. Rosenblum, Inc. v. Adler, 461 A.2d 138, 152 (N.J. 1983).
34. See Robert L. Rabin, Tort Recovery for Negligently Inflicted Economic Loss: A Reassess-
ment, 37 STAN. L. R~v. 1513 (1985) (discussing tort law's effect on incentives).
35. Dale Arthur Oesterle & Jon R. Norberg, Management Buyouts: Creating or Appropriating
Shareholder Wealth?, 41 VAND. L. REv. 207, 249-54 (1988).
36. Lucian Arye Bebchuk & Marcel Kahan, Fairness Opinions: How Fair Are They and What
Can Be Done About It?, 1989 DuicE L.J. 27. The authors make the following recommendations:
First, courts should develop a definition of fair price that they consider proper. Investment
banks, in turn, should disclose their definitions of fair price. Second, to reduce discretion
in the measurement of fair price, the weight given to a fairness opinion should depend on
whether the opinion contains information on the range of fair prices and on the sensitivity
of the price estimate. Third, courts should discount fairness opinions when the writing
bank is compensated by a contingent fee, when it is involved in other aspects of the transac-
tion, and when it has had prior dealings with the company at issue.
Id. at 53. I argue, in essence, that the third recommendation does not go far enough.
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fiduciary duty by a firm's directors or officers. Shareholders must prove
a breach of duty by directors or officers and knowing assistance in the
breach by investment bankers. If proven, the primary defendants and the
aiders and abettors are jointly and severally liable for the plaintiff's in-
jury.37 The threshold requirement of proof of a fiduciary breach by an
officer troubles Professor Fiflis. He wants investment bankers to be cul-
pable even if boards are not. I would rather that we narrow the size of
the class of these cases; culpability of investment bankers usually ought
to signal culpability of the board. Outside of aiding and abetting viola-
tions, shareholder's primary target ought to remain their own directors.
Boards use fairness opinions as shields to liability: a board relying on
an expert opinion exercises due care. It ought to be evidence of a lack of
due care, however, if a fairness opinion is patently contrived to support a
board's predetermined result. Courts, outraged with providers over the
shoddiness of conclusory fairness opinions, ought to turn their outrage
against requesting boards as well for attempting to hide behind such
ruses. Too often, courts stop one step short. Complaints about the prac-
tices of an investment banker should lead to inquiries into the practices
of the requesting board. They should state that for a board to attempt to
use shoddy opinions of experts in justification of proposed firm actions
(or, at minimum, to waste a substantial amount of a firm's assets in pay-
ing for such poor work) is evidence of a possible breach of fiduciary
duty.38
Thus, if a board commissions a fairness opinion under a contingent fee,
as in the Metromedia case, or commissions a fairness opinion from an
investment banker who also will underwrite any debt securities used in a
successful deal, and then relies heavily on such an opinion in pushing the
transaction with its shareholders or in justifying its action before the
courts, courts ought to use the board's opportunism against it. It is a
racket, and the courts ought to label it as such. Of course, broadening
the class of cases in which a board is liable primarily for a breach of duty
to shareholders will also increase the number of potential aiding and
abetting claims against bankers.
At present, an aiding and abetting charge against investment bankers,
37. Laventhol, Krekstein, Horwath & Horwath v. Tuckman, 372 A.2d 168 (Del. 1976).
38. For three examples in which courts did hold conclusory fairness opinions against sitting
boards, see Howing Co. v. Nationwide Corp., 826 F.2d 1470 (6th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 486 U.S.
1059 (1988); Mills Acquisition Co. v. Macmillan, Inc., 559 A.2d 1261 (Del. 1988); In re Meyers
Parking Sys., Inc., [1988-89 Transfer Binder] Fed. See. L. Rep. (CCH) 84,333 (Sept. 12, 1988).
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brought by shareholders, requires knowing assistance by the defendants
in a board's breach of duty to shareholders. Knowing assistance in such
cases ought to include the preparation of fairness opinions that contain
evaluations of a fair price when a banker knows he or she has done insuf-
ficient investigation and synthesis of even readily available facts, or when
a banker knows that the opinion is misleading because it is grounded in
an undisclosed and nonobvious standard of fairness. 39
It is possible (although much less likely than a collusion scenario) that
a board has relied reasonably on an investment banker (the banker oper-
ated under no apparent conflict of interest, had sufficient time to do an
investigation, had a reputation for competence and integrity, and re-
sponded well to board questions) and the fairness opinion later turns out
to have been prepared incompetently. In those few cases in which a
board is innocent of any culpable complicity in hiring an investment
banker who submits a poorly done fairness opinion, the board as now
ought to remain the primary complainant in court, basing its allegations
for recovery from bankers on a breach of contract or a malpractice the-
ory. These cases occur most frequently when a failed LBO firm is placed
in the hands of a debtor in possession in bankruptcy, who, responsible for
augmenting the bankruptcy estate for the benefit of the creditors, is look-
ing for litigation targets.4' Outside of bankruptcy proceedings, share-
holders upset over a board's refusal to sue breaching investment bankers
can bring a shareholder derivative action on behalf of the firm. At mini-
mum, the board, in moving to dismiss a suit brought by shareholders,
must explain to a judge its failure to prosecute.41
In suits against investment bankers, a change in doctrine on applicable
standards of conduct is necessary to increase, at the margin, the routine
performance of investment bankers who seek, for a fee, to provide fair-
ness opinions. First, the courts and the SEC ought to look to the invest-
ment banking community for a better definition of professional standards
39. For a discussion of the many different undisclosed standards of fairness one sees in an
opinion, see Bebchuk & Kahan, supra note 36, at 29-34.
40. The only case I know of in which an investment banker was held liable in damages was a
case brought by a client, Rawson Food Stores, in Florida. The case is unreported. Rawson paid
Prudential Bache Securities to advise it on the acquisition of 43 stores. When Rawson filed for
bankruptcy, the debtor in possession sued Prudential, contending that the value of the purchased
stores was far less than Prudential had opined. A jury awarded $2 million to Rawson's owner and
$21.6 million to the company. See JuryAwards Rawson $23.6 million from Prudential Bache, Assoc.
Press, Aug. 30, 1988, available in LEXIS, Nexis library, AP file.
41. See Zapata Corp. v. Maldonado, 430 A.2d 779 (Del. 1981) (interested board may move to
dismiss derivative action if adjudged by a court to be in the best interests of the firm).
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that control the content of fairness opinions.4 2 If investment bankers
balk, courts, relying on expert testimony,4" or the SEC, using its rule-
making authority, ought to encourage the investment banking commu-
nity to action by threatening to fashion default rules. The SEC has made
sporadic, tentative moves in this direction in its drafting Item 8 in Sched-
ule 13e-3.'
Second, and perhaps more important, is a recharacterization of the
obligation of the investment banker to a client firm as one of fiduciary
duty as well as contract, similar to the relationship of a lawyer to a client
firm.45 The traditional elements of a fiduciary relationship are present:
the client hires an expert, relying on his or her reputation for competence
and integrity, to give service that involves the sophisticated exercise of
trained professional judgment and discretion and that a client cannot as-
sess for quality at the time it is provided. An investment banker provid-
ing a fairness opinion should be treated like an attorney providing a legal
opinion, an accountant providing an audit opinion, or a portfolio man-
ager providing an investment opinion. Such a shift in doctrine would
limit permissible conflicts of interest and establish minimum, nonwaiv-
able standards of performance. Fiduciary principles add a duty of loy-
alty and a minimum standard of due care to the basic contractual duty of
adequate performance as specified or implied in the terms of the agree-
ment.46 If courts treat investment bankers as fiduciaries (not to the
shareholders but to the firm), courts will necessarily play a larger role
42. For an excellent preliminary effort at such guidelines, see Arthur H. Rosenbloom & Arthur
H. Aufses III, On Understanding Investment Banker Liability, INSIGHTS, Apr. 1990, at 3.
43. See In vestment Banker Liability: Transcription of a Panel Discussion, supra note 8, at 590-
92, 597-601 (Remarks of Vice-Chancellor Carolyn Berger of the Delaware Court of Chancery; Re-
marks of Dale Arthur Oesterle). See also Howing Co. v. Nationwide Corp., 826 F.2d 1470, 1479
(6th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 486 U.S. 1059 (1988) (detailing requirements for a proper fairness
opinion).
44. See, e-g., Management Buyouts: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Telecommunications and
Finance of the House Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 1-10 (1988) (state-
ment of SEC Chairman David Ruder) (the SEC was considering an expansion of the scope of SEC
Rule 13e-3, 17 C.F.R. § 240.13e-3 (1991)). Item 8(a) contains a substantial amount of detail. It
does not, however, ask drafters to specify the exact standard of fairness used. See supra note 25.
45. The relationship of investment banker to firm seems easily to meet the first part of the well-
known basic definition. A fiduciary relationship exists when parties to a transaction do not meet on
equal footing, i.e., when one party has full knowledge and the other does not, and the latter places
confidence in the former, or whenever confidence is reposed in one who is able to exert influence over
the party entrusting confidence. See Dawson v. National Life Ins. Co., 157 N.W. 929 (Iowa 1916).
46. See Broad v. Rockwell Int'l Corp., 614 F.2d 418, 430-31 (5th Cir. 1980) (distinguishing
fiduciary duty from contract obligations).
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regulating conflicts of interest.47 Investment bankers will be prohibited
from providing fairness opinions when they have conflicts of interest un-
less they, at minimum, fully disclose those conflicts to client boards and
receive boards' assent and waiver.48 Moreover, as for lawyers, in extreme
cases broad grants of waiver, even with knowledge, will not sanitize the
offending conduct. There are some cases in which bankers should not be
able to provide fairness opinions because the conflict of interest is too
severe.
49
CONCLUSION
We ought not use fairness opinions from investment lenders as substi-
tutes for sound board judgment (as some boards have done) or for sound
judicial evaluation of board judgment (as some courts have done) in con-
trol-change transactions. Nor should we use investment bankers as in-
voluntary public policemen in such transactions; coercing both the police
and the policed in such a system seems doomed in the long run, as both
parties have incentives to collude in effecting the regulation's defeat.
Rather, we ought to recognize that investment banker fairness opinions
are primarily information for boards and, secondarily, if both opinion
providers and boards agree, advertising aimed at shareholders. In both
cases, the opinions are essentially optional, and the business judgment of
a board, not a court, ought to be the primary determinate of whether a
fairness opinion will be useful.
Moreover, the recipients of a fairness opinion expect that the service
will meet minimal standards of competence and integrity, and this expec-
tation, if frustrated, ought to give the direct recipients redress in court. If
boards use contrived fairness opinions to protect themselves from share-
holders' suits or to mislead shareholders who must approve a control
change transaction, both board and banker ought to be liable jointly.
Any more than this is problematic.
There is an overwhelming and understandable temptation for parties
(including judges) involved in high stakes, high risk control change trans-
actions to reduce their individual exposure to the risk of a decision that
47. For a fine discussion of the many conflict-of-interest problems found in the writing of fair-
ness opinions, see Bebchuk & Kahan, supra note 36, at 37-45.
48. Boards ought to disclose fully those conflicts to shareholders as well whenever a board
decides to communicate the contents of an opinion to them.
49. An investment banker representing both buyer and seller, for example, ought not to issue
fairness opinions for either, even if either board solicits, with full knowledge, an opinion.
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later proves wrong. This temptation often can lead to calls for soothing
legal rules, as judges, for example, look for easy signposts for decisions in
these complicated cases and as potential defendant classes seek either
safe harbors or methods of shifting liability for decisions onto the backs
of others participating in the transaction. We ought to resist such
narcotics.
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